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THE GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Jeffrey D. Sachs
In the waning days of the Soviet Empire, when the linkages between flaggingeconomic power and the changing state of national security in the Soviet Un-
ion were becoming obvious, one story really hit home. It was the story of a gen-
tleman waiting in one of the interminable bread queues in Moscow. Late in the
Mikhail Gorbachev era, of course, the lines were getting longer, as the economic
chaos in the Soviet Union worsened. Finally the bedraggled Muscovite reached
the counter, where the clerk told him, “I’m sorry, we’ve run out of bread.” The
poor man exploded. The clerk said, “Now wait a minute, mister. If it weren’t for
Gorbachev, you would have been shot for saying something like that.” The Mus-
covite went home and lamented to his wife, “Dear, it’s much worse than I
thought. They’ve run out of bullets, too.”
There was a lot of grim humor in those days, and it has not been much less
grim in the last few years. The Russian transformation has been bumpy, to say
the least. More accurately, that transformation has been unsuccessful in recent
years. This is a topic that I obviously ponder often, having served for two years,
1992 and 1993, as a senior economic advisor to the Russian government. I reflect
on what might have been done differently, what we might have advised differ-
ently, whether there was another course of action that would have led to a more
stable and prosperous society—something that I believe to be in not only Rus-
sia’s interest but that of the United States as well.
But before getting to particular times and places, it would be useful to take up
a very broad theme—nothing less than global economic dynamics—as a way to
understand somewhat the nature of the world economy right now: the ways dif-
ferent regions fit into a fast-changing picture, the real economic struggles that
engage most of the world.
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Without question, the buzzword of our era is globalization. Some say this
term is now so hackneyed as to be without content. In fact, it is a real phenome-
non, one that is important for us to understand. But it is also important that dif-
ferent parts of the world fit into this fast, globalizing system in thoroughly
different ways and have equally different economic prospects. One part of our
analysis, then, is the shape of the world system as it is evolving; there is also the
important question of why different parts of the world, different geographies or
ecologies, face such different futures in it. Let us start, therefore, with some basic
ideas about globalization, and then turn to the differences, which I think is the
more interesting subject.
GLOBALIZATION
Globalization is a dynamic process of the economic integration of virtually the
entire world. At least four aspects of this increased economic integration are
worth bearing in mind. What most of us think of as the first part of globalization
is increased international trade. There is no doubt that the role of international
trade within any individual economy, and therefore for the world as a whole, has
been increasing in importance relative to other kinds of economic activity. A
typical measure that economists use is an economy’s ratio of exports or imports
to total output—that is, gross domestic product, GDP. If we look at the ratio of
either exports or imports to GDP for virtually any economy in the world, we find
that it has been rising; in a number of economies it has been rising particularly
rapidly in the last fifteen years. On a day-to-day basis, economies today feel the
effect of the international system much more heavily than they did forty years
ago. Firms increasingly are directly engaged overseas as exporters or importers,
and producers are exposed to competition of imports from the rest of the world.
In general, economic theory has taught—and the idea is very much con-
firmed by the evidence—that this growth in international trade is a source of in-
creased productivity for all participants. Trade, as economists have been
emphasizing ever since Adam Smith in 1776, is not a zero-sum game, where one
side wins and the other side loses; rather, it is an opportunity for increased diver-
sity of products, increased specialization, transmission of information and tech-
nology, and the like, and therefore a positive-sum game. The most obvious
aspect of globalization, then, is simply the increased interpenetration of markets
through the trade of goods and services.
A second point, one that is absolutely pivotal, is the increased in-
terpenetration of markets by capital flows. Headlines in the last three years about
globalization have been much more about capital flows than about trade. We
have witnessed a recurring, sharp, and important kind of economic crisis, that
is, crises undergone by countries in the process of globalization—a type of crisis
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closely linked to the international financial system. We saw them in East Asia be-
ginning in 1997, in Thailand in July, then in Indonesia and Korea. The chaos that
continues in Indonesia is rooted not only in geopolitics and local politics but
also in the economic collapse that struck the nation at the end of 1997—a col-
lapse clearly rooted in international financial flows. Huge amounts of money
poured into Indonesia in the mid 1980s; then, just as suddenly, huge amounts of
money flowed out in the fall of 1997. That rapid withdrawal of capital brought
down the economy and with it the Suharto regime (which had its own weak-
nesses, to be sure) and led to cascading political and social change of incredible
dynamism and risk.
The third aspect of globalization is the globalization of economic produc-
tion. Economics textbooks, at least older ones, speak of, say, American products
and Japanese products, and give the impression that countries simply trade their
products with each other. But international trade today involves more and more
not merely the exchange of one nation’s products for another’s but the exchange
of products representing work done in ten, twenty, or even thirty countries. This
process has become so complex that we can no longer say that this particular
car is Japanese or this computer is American; the components are invariably
from half a dozen or more countries—two dozen or more in a typical automo-
bile or computer.
What has happened is that an increasing proportion of international produc-
tion is carried out by major multinational firms. These firms typically locate
their headquarters in the world’s wealthiest regions—the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, Japan, in a few cases Korea or Southeast Asia—but their produc-
tion sites are all over the world. Production itself is a rich logistical process that
involves bringing components from one place, shipping them to another, divid-
ing up what economists and business consultants call the “value chain” (itself a
process of ever-increasing complexity) and then farming out the individual
parts of the production process to areas of comparative advantage. In one region
one handles logistical functions; in another region one takes advantage of low
wages, in yet another of particular natural resources; and so forth. What this
means is that a country’s geographic relationship to major markets is crucial to
how it is integrated—or why it is not integrated—into an increasingly global-
ized production structure. The determination of who wins and who loses, or at
least who falls farther behind, is very much determined by geography. The im-
portance of location for economic success has been enhanced by the globaliza-
tion of production processes.
A fourth and quite fascinating dimension of globalization is the increasing
institutional harmonization of economic policies, legislation, and structure.
Not only are countries becoming integrated into a web of production, a network
S A C H S 9 5
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of capital flows, and an international market for goods and services, but they en-
gage in these activities increasingly in a common structure of national and inter-
national institutions. By far the most dramatic example of this is the collapse of
communism as a rival economic system, followed by the adoption, though as yet
incomplete, by most postcommunist countries of imported, or derivative, legal
and institutional structures that are compatible with those of the major markets.
There are, for example, 135 countries in the World Trade Organization, created in
1995 to harmonize global trading rules and procedures. Underpinning the World
Trade Organization is a corpus of international law setting forth in excruciating
detail how international trade is to
proceed: what kinds of regulations
are fair game, which ones are not,
even how sanitary standards can be
applied. For example, when can a na-
tion impose trade barriers if it thinks
another is violating environmental
norms? How should intellectual property standards be enforced? Patent law is
now being “harmonized” internationally for the first time. Similarly, countries
now regulate the convertibility of their currencies according to standards they ac-
cept as members of the International Monetary Fund, a body even more universal
than the World Trade Organization.
All this has the effect of making international law without an international
government—a highly difficult, challenging, and so far only partially successful
venture. There are those in the United States who feel that it is ceding too much
sovereignty by allowing international standards to determine what it does.
There are others, closer to my own outlook, who feel that such standards are
what prevents the rule of the jungle in international economic affairs and that
the nation should be striving for such shared agreements. But whatever one’s
normative stance, the positive, or diagnostic, view of the world scene is that in-
stitutional harmonization—of how markets are organized, how banks are regu-
lated, how food standards are imposed, even how intellectual property rights are
organized—is now proceeding faster and is extending over more of the globe, by
far, than at any other time in world history. Here we see more than 130 countries
announcing that they want to live by a common set of economic codes and stan-
dards and to organize their own internal politics and policies according to them.
That encapsulates what globalization is about. It is a very deep process, in-
volving not simply trade but finance, production, and even the rules of national
economies and how they relate to each other. What is driving it, and why so dra-
matically? Several forces are at play, and they are both pervasive and persistent.
This phenomenon is not going to disappear because of some local derangement.
9 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The trend is not irreversible, but to knock it off course will take more than a
protectionist’s winning an election, or an economic crisis in Colombia, Thai-
land, or Brazil.
WHY NOW?
At bottom, what is pushing globalization is that most of the world, particularly
the developing countries, tried just about everything else first. They have now
arrived, by elimination, at the realization that they must join the world econ-
omy. This has not been a linear process, in which countries recognized the ad-
vantages of participating in the international marketplace and decided to sign
up. It has been distinctly nonlinear. During the last 150 to two hundred years,
governments went in very different directions.
For most of world history, the vast majority of countries were poor. There was
not much variation in economic performance or wealth until around 1800. At
that point, one small part of the world took off—the
Western European and the North Atlantic nations.
There a dynamic process of industrialization built on
new forms of harnessing power, particularly steam and
coal, and new mechanized technologies. These
states—primarily Britain and the United States, for
quite a while—so accelerated their economic develop-
ment that the military imbalances in their favor with
respect to the rest of the world became even more
marked than they had been for the preceding century
or two. That translated, of course, into a very rapid
carving-up of the world into the imperial property of,
mainly, the European powers.
Why then did not worldwide institutional harmonization come easily? One
reason is an interlude of about a century in which Western industrialization pro-
duced a profoundly skewed balance of power. Europe now owned a very large
part of the world: Africa was completely gobbled up in the 1870s and 1880s, In-
dia by 1857, much of Southeast Asia in the 1850s and 1860s, Indochina about
that same time, North Africa in the 1830s, and so on.
This state of affairs was thought in 1910 to be the permanent shape of the
world (warning us, by the way, that however deep and persistent a state of affairs
globalization may be, we should not simply extrapolate). In 1911, a book, The
Great Illusion, by Norman Angell, was published in Britain and became
famous. Its thrust was that the world economic system was in place: it was
owned by Europe, and Europe was the industrial center. While industry would
slowly diffuse to the rest of the world, the system was stable. War, Angell argued,
S A C H S 9 7
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had become so costly and devastating as to be unthinkable. As might be imag-
ined, Angell’s book was a terrific best-seller in 1912 and 1913, but it quickly fell
off the best-seller list in 1914. What had seemed an unshakable, permanent in-
ternational system disappeared.
Mr. Angell tried again in 1934, when he wrote another book. This one had
quite a realistic hypothesis. In it Angell said, in effect, “I told you so back in 1911.
And I was right. War was devastating for our civilization. Human beings some-
times have to learn through experience. Now you’ve seen it. We are done with
this.” He proclaimed, again, the end of war in Europe. This book also was soon
remaindered, unfortunately. But by 1945, with Europe devastated and war-torn,
the end of the imperial era was in sight. Europe had so weakened itself that its
imperial holdings of the world soon broke away, in a series of anticolonial
wars—India in 1947, Indonesia in 1948, Egypt in 1952, and so on.
What is interesting is that what became known as the “developing world” did
not, as it became independent, simply jump to the global system. To understand
why not, let us put ourselves in the position of Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, or Sukarno at the moment of independence. If one has been struggling
for decades against British domination in India, and if the first British coloniz-
ing power in India had not been even the Raj but the East India Company, a pri-
vate multinational firm, the idea that the way to sovereignty and development is
to open the doors to foreign multinationals might not seem convincing. All over
the developing world, a simple logic prevailed: “Look, we are weak, they are
strong. They used to own us; we have just got rid of them. We have to develop
and industrialize quickly so that we can rebalance power in the world. But we
cannot risk inviting them in to do that. What we need is a development strategy
that will protect us while we gain our strength.”
There were two variants of this strategy—soft and hard. The hard variant, of
course, was Bolshevism, as spread first within Russia after the chaos of World
War I, then by the Red Army after World War II, and later by imitators in other
parts of the world, including the Maoist revolutionaries in China. The softer
variant of this strategy was pursued not by one-party socialist-Leninist states
but by regimes that chose not to monopolize the means of production but in-
stead to spur industrialization by planting and protecting the seeds of indus-
try—an approach that came to be known as “state-led industrialization.”
A third of the world lived under “hard” socialism through the mid-1980s; an-
other 40 percent or so lived under some kind of state-led industrialization. Both
failed spectacularly. They failed for reasons that Adam Smith identified in 1776:
closing doors means losing access to world knowledge. They lost the ability to
tap into world technologies that they would otherwise have acquired through
open trade and foreign investment. At the most fundamental level, this is the
9 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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biggest problem with any kind of closed regime; the world moves on without
you. Conceivably the United States, given its incredible dynamism and inven-
tiveness, could go it alone—but probably not. Certainly for any other country in
the world, the vast majority of the technologies needed for development must
come from outside. However dynamic a nation is, it can develop only a small
fraction of the technologies, manufacturing processes, and capital goods that it
needs. International trade and foreign direct investment are absolutely funda-
mental to any successful development strategy.
Most of the regimes that tried state, and state-led, socialism went bankrupt.
Bankruptcy is an interesting process and a systemic one. It could be seen in the
nineteenth century when Europe threatened the sovereignty and survival of
competitors, like the Ottoman Em-
pire. Those empires usually ended
up going bankrupt rather than being
defeated militarily. They went bank-
rupt because when countries fall be-
hind they tend to borrow in order to
purchase foreign technology, mili-
tary equipment, and even mercenary armies, in an effort to rectify the balance.
The Ottomans borrowed heavily in the 1850s and 1860s trying to modernize; in
the 1870s they went broke. Most of the state-led industrializers and most of the
socialist countries (not all—China is a particular exception) did the same and
went bankrupt—not morally, economically, or technologically but literally. The
Soviet Union ran out of dollars in 1991. Gorbachev, for example, had borrowed
about forty billion dollars from West German banks and Western governments
between 1986 and 1990, and by 1991 that flow of funds was drying up. The result
was hyperinflation, intensification of shortages, weakness and desperation of the re-
gime,perhaps the tempting of the 1991 coup plotters, and the quick downward spiral.
Why did Solidarity emerge as a powerful political force in Poland in
1980?—because Poland had gone bankrupt in 1978. Being somewhat closer to
the West, Poland had started borrowing earlier than the Soviet Union, when Ed-
ward Gierek instituted reforms in the early 1970s. The financial squeeze came
later in the decade, and Polish living standards plummeted. People took to
the streets. An electrician, Lech Walesa, jumped the fence at Gdansk’s Lenin
Shipyards, and Solidarity was born. Financial crisis was the precursor of po-
litical revolution.
Some seventy governments went bankrupt in the 1980s and early 1990s. A fa-
mous banker, Walter Wriston, the chairman of Citibank, once proclaimed that
countries never go bankrupt; it was, accordingly, part of Citibank’s strategy to
lend to countries—in the years before it almost went bankrupt itself. In one
S A C H S 9 9
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sense, what Wriston said is correct: countries do live on. But it is absolutely a fact
that governments can go bankrupt, can find themselves without the funds to pay
their bills. This is not a rarity; it happens frequently. It results in part from the
great imbalances of economic power that cause countries, especially poor and
poorly organized ones, to borrow desperately to offset weaknesses, thereby dig-
ging themselves deeper.
This historical excursion answers the question posed earlier: why did global-
ization start so late, and then so dramatically? After a series of events that started
in about 1840, dozens of governments went bankrupt, fairly simultaneously, in
the 1980s. They reached a dead end, looked for success stories to emulate, and
found one—the incredible economic, financial, and military power of the
United States. The American model and its influence quickly assumed such
dominance that the reform process itself has become known as the Washington
Consensus. Countries have abandoned the failed strategy of closure and are
joining the international system.
THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND GLOBALIZATION
The other deep force at work, aside from globalization, is the technological revo-
lution, which steadily raises the dividends of being part of the international sys-
tem. Not only is staying out costly, but getting in yields higher and higher
returns. The underlying information, communications, logistics, and transport
technologies are making it possible for more countries to globalize, and in
deeper ways.
Who are the real winners now? They are a handful of developing countries,
primarily of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, that did not opt for state social-
ism or state-led development—South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Ma-
laysia. They went a different way. The way they went, of course, brought them
under the U.S. security umbrella; in response, they integrated their economies
into the U.S. production system.
Singapore is a classic example. Even in the British Empire, it was a free port.
After its independence in 1965, it maintained itself as essentially a free port,
strongly linked to American production. Singapore’s strategy was to hook into
U.S. industry, mainly in electronics but also to some extent in textiles and ap-
parel, importing components and exporting assembled, integrated products for
the American market. Advances in information technology and transport al-
lowed Singapore, although it is halfway around the world, to do this in a cost-ef-
fective manner. Singapore has built state-of-the-art port facilities, which turn
around containerships in just six hours. Its firms are electronically linked to
U.S.-based multinationals. Orders and design specifications are received
through computer-aided design and manufacturing systems; firms know
1 0 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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exactly what template to use or which motherboard to install. Computerized
data transmission has enabled Singapore’s firms to become deeply enmeshed in
the U.S. production process.
These technological developments, especially the widespread use of
containerization (computerization and the Internet came much later), made
the East Asian boom possible. Without containerization it would not have
been possible for East Asia to incorporate itself into the U.S. economy as
deeply as it did. Containerization drastically reduced the costs of merchandise
shipments, particularly for capital goods, thereby greatly facilitating the glob-
alization of production.
On one side, then, there were failed, old systems. On the other side there was
the underlying dynamism of the technologies of global networking in the fields
of information, computerization, communication, and transport. The push and
pull of globalization has been so compelling that by the late 1980s, it is fair to say,
almost no part of the world, and almost no world leader, dared to stay on the
sidelines. That is the main reason why we have seen such a dramatic move to-
ward institutional harmonization in the last ten years. These forces are so deep
that nothing of less than worldwide impact—not a recession in the United
States, or financial crisis in a country or two—is likely to divert them. Events that
could undo this process would be of the kind that undid the pre-1914 system
and that occurred between 1914 and 1945—a combination of war and profound
economic crisis resulting in deep rupture on a global scale. Globalization is not
set and assured, but it is moving in a very deep channel, where it is felt strategi-
cally by almost all leaders. The presidents and prime ministers of developing
countries, even those in the midst of crises, are not asking how to escape global-
ization or how to protect their countries by closing their economies. They are
asking how it can be made to work for them.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION
In some places globalization is working, and in others it is not. What are some of
the structural underpinnings of success or failure in this world system? What do
they suggest about U.S. economic strategy and about tactics the United States
can use to help incorporate countries into the world system, for its interests as
well as their own? Are there policies that will make this process more equitable?
Let us start with the crucial fact that globalization is taking place in a world of
astounding inequality—the greatest inequality in world history. We can say that
with confidence, without having explored every era since civilization began
some ten thousand years ago, because, as noted earlier, through 1800 everybody
was poor. Not until the last two hundred years did vast inequalities of income
S A C H S 1 0 1
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develop, because only in the last two hundred years did industrialization and
science-based economic growth emerge.
When it did, a huge increase in the gap between rich and poor arose. In 1820,
according to estimates by the leading economic historian of long-term growth,
the richest part of the world was Western Europe, with a per capita income of
around $1,200. The poorest part of the world was Sub-Saharan Africa, with an
income of about four hundred dol-
lars per capita. (These numbers are
adjusted to be somewhat comparable
to our sense of dollars today in terms
of purchasing power.) The ratio was
about three to one. Over the course
of the next 180 years, Western European income grew twentyfold; in the United
States as well, income, in very rough terms, also increased twentyfold. In Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, per capita income grew only threefold; shockingly, that region has
only now arrived at something like the income level of Britain in 1820. The gap
between richest and poorest has grown to around twenty, or even twenty-five, to
one, now; if we take only the very richest countries and the very poorest, the dif-
ferential is forty, fifty, or sixty to one.
If these income gaps were entirely random, a graphic representation of per
capita income in the world would show a random distribution of the rich coun-
tries and poorer ones. But in fact there are geographical gradients in the distri-
bution of world income. First of all, there is the basic gradient that virtually all of
the rich countries of the world are outside of the tropics, and virtually all of the
poor countries are in them. Temperate-zone countries are either rich, socialist
and therefore poor now, or deeply landlocked—and maybe also socialist, and
therefore deeply in trouble. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong, virtually all of
the tropic zone remains poor today. Tropical countries are not necessarily des-
perately or uniformly poor, but they are poor. Climate, then, accounts for a quite
significant proportion of the cross-national and cross-regional disparities of
world income.
Another geographical gradient that is quite important is proximity to mar-
kets. That has been true ever since Adam Smith wrote. The “name of the game”
in international trade, as it has been in world power, often has been naval access.
Coastal countries routinely do better than interior, landlocked parts of the
world. Even today, despite air, rail, the Internet, and everything else, the largest
proportion of international trade still travels by sea. For a landlocked country
the cost of moving a container to a port is ferociously high. That is true because
it must not only go over land, which is expensive, but cross political borders,
which is often even more expensive. Studies conducted by Harvard’s Center for
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International Development have consistently shown that proximity, especially
political proximity, to the sea is very important. Which are the poorest countries
of the world? They are the tropical, landlocked countries: Chad, Mali, Niger,
Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, and Bolivia.
There are, then, two major barriers to international development—a clima-
tic barrier and a geographical, or physical transport, barrier. These are real
problems, with real implications for the success or failure of globalization.
First, the countries that tend to be successful are those that are near major mar-
kets; a country that is proximate to major markets and has a coastline is in es-
pecially good shape, once it opens up. Let us think about what that means in
some specific cases.
For a number of reasons, Mexico and Central America, North Africa, and
Eastern Europe fell far behind their developed neighbors, before globalization
began. Some were colonized by their neighbors; others absented themselves
from the world economy. Some faced physical, geographical, or resource barri-
ers, and some had bad luck. Today, in the age of globalization, new underlying
forces are flowing in favor of some of these nations.
Mexico is an example. Certainly, it has experienced serious problems with fi-
nancial flows—the banking crisis of 1994 comes to mind. Also, its political sys-
tem is only now in the process of reform, after a long period of one-party rule.
But to the north, across the Rio Grande, is the United States, with a per ca-
pita income of some thirty thousand dollars; Mexico has a per capita in-
come of three thousand dollars. The result is a powerful force bringing
technology and investment to Mexico; that is exactly what is happening.
Mexico’s economic prospects are quite good; the underlying geography
supports its development.
North Africa has been culturally and, for a long time, economically and polit-
ically cut off from its northern neighbors across the Mediterranean. Rome and
Carthage fought each other more than two thousand years ago; the Christian-
Islamic divide prevented the establishment of normal relations for about seven
hundred years. But Tunisia, for example, is only about a hundred kilometers
away from Italian territory. With Italian per capita income at twenty thousand
dollars and Tunisia’s at two thousand, there will be a very powerful economic
flow between the two countries. Italian firms will take advantage of the income
differential by investing in Tunisia; Fiat, for instance, will make automotive
components in Tunis and then reexport them to Italy. Indeed, Tunisia is growing
quite well right now, as is its neighbor, Morocco. Greek Cypress, which unlike its
Turkish counterpart has not been subjected to a Western European embargo, is
booming right now. That is the result of geographic proximity.
S A C H S 1 0 3
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Among the transition economies, the most successful are those located along
the border of Western Europe. History and culture play roles, but geographic
proximity, facilitating trade and investment, is an important factor. The Baltic
States are becoming workshops for Scandinavia. Scandinavian and German firms
are investing in Estonia to produce components for reexport, thereby raising Esto-
nia’s living standards. Poland’s boom can be ascribed to geographic proximity. The
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia are experiencing the same phenom-
enon of proximity. Go inland a thousand kilometers to Moldavia or the Balkans,
however, or two thousand kilometers into the heartland of Russia, or five thousand
kilometers into Central Asia, and one finds none of that economic pull. Why, after
all, would an Italian textile company outsource stitching to Turkmenistan?
The other developmental barrier is climate. Why is climate so important in
this day and age? It is because poor countries still face problems that wealthier
countries left behind long ago. The tropics pose tremendous difficulties for basic
food production. Growing rice or maize in a lowland tropical environment is
generally very tough; farmers are plagued by pests, veterinary disease, weak soils,
rapid soil erosion, and other environmental barriers. Another profound chal-
lenge, particularly in Africa, is health. Diseases like malaria still impose huge
economic, social, and health burdens on the tropical world.
A large part of the tropics has been trapped in a vicious circle. The tropics
were poorer in the last century than the temperate zones, because of a variety of
deep problems. The larger markets in the rich temperate zones supported more
research and technological development. Advances pushed income even higher
in those zones but could not be readily diffused to the tropics; ecological condi-
tions were too different. Whether in areas of medicine, public health, food pro-
ductivity, construction, or energy use, the gap widened. Tropical countries
experienced a massive brain drain. People with critical skills packed up and went
to work in Cambridge, Silicon Valley, or elsewhere, further widening the gap be-
tween underlying national and regional capabilities.
Countries that are both tropical and far from markets face the most profound
problems. It is in tropical, geographically disadvantaged countries and regions
that we see some of the biggest humanitarian challenges and social disasters. It is
no accident that genocide took place in Rwanda. Obviously, we must avoid
crude geographic determinism, but Rwanda’s location poses near-insurmount-
able problems for economic development. It is plagued by intense crowding, en-
vironmental stress, and vast struggles among groups over resources for survival;
further, it is without the port that could turn its capital, Kigali, into an export
processing zone and otherwise contribute to economic development.
These ecological and geographical factors are very important and deserve
greater attention from analysts and policy makers alike. Countries that are
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favorably located generally tend to make it, unless their politics are so deeply
skewed as to pose a fundamental barrier—and there are such cases. We have not
yet begun to address the implications of the profound problems that tropical
countries and landlocked regions represent for international economic institu-
tions, foreign assistance programs, and the way we think about development.
This is obviously a mixed assessment. For significant parts of the world, there is
reason for considerable optimism. Despite all the wonders of globalization,
however, serious risks remain for others. Not all of the world will be fruitfully
touched by the processes of globalization.
For even the “proximate” countries—the ones blessed by geographic loca-
tion, with the wind at their backs—the process of escaping from the damage of
the past, from weak institutions, from economic atrophy, and from financial
bankruptcy remains a heavy burden. They must meet the challenges both of
catching up and of successful transformation. Not all manage, and when gov-
ernments go bankrupt, societies cannot function. One of the legacies of the last
fifty years is bankrupt governments all over the world. We sometimes use that
fact tactically, as a lever by which friendly governments can be kept in place, or
by which regimes can be controlled and manipulated. That approach is a mis-
take. At the edge of bankruptcy, even the consolidation of political power suffi-
cient to maintain internal order is in jeopardy. American foreign-policy makers
trying to work with “difficult” countries find that things explode in their faces.
Things seem to be going fine, just before a quite dramatic collapse of authority
and civil power. At the roots of these collapses often lie economic problems,
problems severe enough to pull down governments and therefore open the way
to anarchy.
What this means is that in our approach to globalization, we need a sensitivity
to geography, to climate, to the history of how we got where we are, and to the fi-
nancial and political struggles of countries. If we adopt this broader view, we can
more effectively ensure that much more of the world will partake of the unbe-
lievable bounty that modern science and technology provide.
S A C H S 1 0 5
14
Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 [2000], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/8
